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With this brief analysis, I would like to show how in the second paragraph 
of the first chapter of the “Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft”, enti-
tled: “Von dem Befugnisse der reinen Vernunft, im praktischen Gebrauche zu 
einer Erweiterung, die ihr im spekulativen für sich nicht möglich ist”, Kant 
provides, in my opinion, a deduction of the applicability of the category of 
causality to noumena and, more specifically, of the concept of causa noume-
non. This deduction is the completion of the deduction, announced in the pre-
vious paragraph “Von der Deduktion der Grundsätze der reinen praktischen 
Vernunft”. 
In order to clarify the terms of the question, we should deal first of all with 
the concept of deduction in Kant. According to the explanation Kant gives of 
the term, “deduction” indicates a legal process, which aims to solve a situa-
tion of conflict between different claims and arrogations about a certain con-
cept or knowledge. Through a deduction, we can clarify the origin of the con-
cept or knowledge and ascertain the legitimacy of its use. 
Thus, we can list five elements, which indicates that a deduction takes pla-
ce: 
· the use of a legal vocabulary; 
· the situation of conflict between different claims and arrogations about 
a concept or a knowledge; 
· the aim to ascertain the legitimacy of its use; 
· the clarification of the origin of the concept or knowledge; 
· the declaration of the legitimacy of the concept or knowledge as con-
clusion of the argumentation. 
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Then we are going to turn to the section on the deduction of the moral 
principle. In this paragraph Kant announces the impossibility of the deduction 
of the moral principle, but affirms that a deduction of the faculty of freedom 
is possible. In this section, he affirms that the objecitve reality of freedom as 
supersensible causality is assured by the moral law, but he does not adress the 
issue of the legitimacy of the use of the causality concept in the non empirical 
world. 
Finally we are going to analyse the paragraph on the extension of pure 
reason in its practical use. In this section, Kant deals with the question about 
the legitimacy of the application of the causality concept to the noumenal 
world. As I intend to show,we find in this paragraph the five elements listed 
above, which identify the deductive proceeding. Considering this, I do think 
he intends here to deduce the application of the category of causality to the 
supersensible field. 
 
1. The concept of “deduction” in Kant 
At the beginning of the chapter of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, dedi-
cated to the deduction of the pure concepts of intellect, Kant explains very 
clearly what he means with the term “deduction”: 
Die Rechtslehrer, wenn sie von Befugnissen und Anmaßungen reden, 
unterscheiden in einem Rechtshandel die Frage über das, was Rechtens 
ist (quid iuris), von der, die die Thatsache angeht (quid facti), und 
indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern, so nennen sie den erstern, der die 
Befugniß oder auch den Rechtsanspruch darthun soll, die Deduction1. 
Dieter Henrich2 shows rightly that the term “deduction” in the eighteenth 
century academic language was not only used to refer to logic, but also is a 
legal term3, which refers to the quaestio iuris concerning the title of a pro-
perty, whether of things or usages. The quaestio iuris arises at the moment of 
conflict of different arrogations (Anmaßungen) and claims (Ansprüche) and it 
                                                                            
1  KrV B116/A 84. 
2  D. HENRICH, Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes. Über die Gründe der Dunkelheit des letzten 
Abschnittes von Kants »Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten«, in Denken im Schatten des 
Nihilismus.Festschrift für Wilhelm Weischedel zum 70. Geburstag (edited by Alexander 
Schwan, Darmstadt 1975), 55-112. D. HENRICH, Kant’s Notion of a Deduction and the Metho-
dological Background of the First Critique, in Kant’s transcendental deductions. The three 
“Critiques” and the “Opus postumum” (edited by Eckard Förster, Stanford California 1989), 
29-46. 
3  D. HENRICH, Kant’s Notion of a Deduction, 31-35. 
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deals to trace the origin of the possession and verifies its legitimacy4. It is not, 
therefore, to examine the factual conditions, which led to the constintution of 
properties, but rather to examine the legal aspects, by virtue of which one 
could reach the possession. This examination on the possession is taken only 
in the condition of doubt on the legitimacy of possession itself5. 
Thus, in terms of Kantian philosophy, according to Henrich, the deduction 
must be distinguished from a logical derivation. In a situation of conflict 
between different arrogations and claims about a certain knowledge, we have 
to bring this one to its origin, so that we can show its legitimate possession. 
The deduction is as well binding as a demonstration: once provided its 
deduction, this knowledge is justified and unquestionable. “To deduce”, 
therefore, presents itself, according to Henrich, as the central task of criti-
cism, in fact: “Kritik” investigates the origins: once clarified its origins, the 
validity (Gültigkeit) of a knowledge is solid6. 
This understanding of the concept of deduction guides my analysis of the 
two concluding paragraphs of the first chapter of the “Analytik der reinen 
praktischen Vernunft”, dedicated to the deduction of the moral principle and 
to the right (permission – Befugnis) of pure reason to an extension in its 
practical use. 
 
2. There can be no deduction of the principle of moral law - The “fact of 
reason” and the “deduction of the faculty of freedom (Vermögen der 
Freiheit)” 
In the remark of paragraph 7, entitled “Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen 
Vernunft”, Kant says for the first time that the consciousness (Bewusstsein) 
of the basic law (i. e. of the categorical imperative, the moral law) can be 
defined a “fact of reason”7. The fundamental law, according to Kant, cannot 
be reasoned out from antecedent data of reason, but imposes itself as syn-
                                                                            
4  L. W. BECK, Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. Ein Kommentar (Übersetzung von 
Karl-Heinz Ilting, München 1995 [3. Auflage, 1. Auflage: 1960), 163. 
5  D. HENRICH, Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes, 78-79. «Damit ist die quaestio juris immer 
eine solche, die auf Rechtstitel des Besitzes, sei es von Sachen, von Leistungsansprüche und 
von Funktionen oder Privilegien geht», 78. D. HENRICH, Kant’s Notion of a Deduction, 35. 
6  D. HENRICH, Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes, 78-80. The legal meaning of the term “de-
duction” and the legal value of “Kritik” were highlighted recently by Reinhard Brandt, who 
states through this procedure we reach a critical outcome against claims of validity of syn-
thetical judgements about necessary knowledge. R. BRANDT, Die Bestimmung des Menschen 
bei Kant (Hamburg 2007), 276-277. 
7  KpV, AA V: 32.2. 
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thetic a priori proposition, which cannot be based on empirical or on pure 
intuition (which, to Kant, is not allowed under any circumstances). 
The significance of the theory of the fact of reason is explained later in 
more detail in the section “Von der Deduktion der Grundsätze der reinen 
praktischen Vernunft”. As we know, after some reflections on possible me-
thods of deduction, Kant in this paragraph comes to the conclusion that we 
cannot deduce the moral law, but it remains certain as fact of the pure 
reason8. 
Besides this, “the vainly sought deduction of the moral principle” seems to 
bring positive results. 
Etwas anderes aber und ganz Widersinnisches tritt an die Stelle dieser 
vergeblich gesuchten Deduction des moralischen Princips, nämlich daß 
es umgekehrt selbst zum Princip der Deduction eines unerforschlichen 
Vermögens dient, welches keine Erfahrung beweisen, die speculative 
Vernunft aber (um unter ihren kosmologischen Ideen das Unbedingte 
seiner Causalität nach zu finden, damit sie sich selbst nicht wider-
spreche) wenigstens als möglich annehmen mußte, nämlich das der 
Freiheit, von der das moralische Gesetz, welches selbst keiner rechtfer-
tigenden Gründe bedarf, nicht blos die Möglichkeit, sondern die 
Wirklichkeit an Wesen beweiset, die dies Gesetz als für sie verbindend 
erkennen. Das moralische Gesetz ist in der That ein Gesetz der Cau-
salität durch Freiheit und also der Möglichkeit einer übersinnlichen 
Natur, so wie das metaphysische Gesetz der Begebenheiten in der 
Sinnenwelt ein Gesetz der Causalität der sinnlichen Natur war, und 
jenes bestimmt also das, was speculative Philosophie unbestimmt 
lassen mußte, nämlich das Gesetz für eine Causalität, deren Begriff in 
der letzteren nur negativ war, und verschafft diesem also zuerst objec-
tive Realität. 
Diese Art von Creditiv des moralischen Gesetzes, da es selbst als ein 
Princip der Deduction der Freiheit als einer Causalität der reinen 
Vernunft aufgestellt wird, ist, da die theoretische Vernunft wenigstens 
die Möglichkeit einer Freiheit anzunehmen genöthigt war, zu Ergän-
zung eines Bedürfnisses derselben statt aller Rechtfertigung a priori 
völlig hinreichend9. 
                                                                            
8  KpV, AA V: 46.16-47.85. 
9  KpV, AA V: 47,86-48.6. 
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The moral principle cannot be deduced, it is not possible in any way to 
demonstrate its objective reality; but a closer look shows that it does not 
require any deduction to ensure its validity: it is an a priori fact of reason, 
certain and doubtless. Through the search for a deduction of moral principle 
we reach a very important result which opens the possibility of a deduction of 
the faculty of freedom: actually, the moral principle gives objective reality to 
the causality with freedom (Kausalität durch Freiheit) by showing (through 
its being a fact of reason) the reality —Wirklichkeit— of the causality with 
freedom in beings who know the moral law as binding themselves. 
The moral law is, in fact, according to Kant, a law of causality with free-
dom and therefore, a law of possibility of a not empirical nature, as the me-
taphysical law of beings in the world of senses is a law of causality of the 
empirical nature. The law of causality with freedom determines, therefore, 
what the speculative philosophy had to leave indefinitely, that is, the law for a 
causality, whose concept was only negative, and the first time it gives 
objective reality to this law. This assures the objective reality of the faculty of 
freedom, as positive causality, as the expression of Kant: “Diese Art von 
Creditiv des moralischen Gesetzes […] ist […] zu Ergänzung eines Bedür-
fnisses derselben statt aller Rechtfertigung a priori völlig hinreichend” indi-
cates10. 
It is important to note that in this paragraph, while Kant uses the term 
“objective reality” and “deduction”, the terms of legal derivation, which iden-
tify the deductive proceedings, are completely absent. Kant makes explicit 
reference to the deduction of the faculty of freedom and indicates the moral 
principle as a principle of this deduction and despite being assured the 
objective reality of the possibility of freedom, the words “Anmassungen”, 
“anmassen”, “Befugniss” and “befugt” are not used (we find only a recu-
rrence of the word “recht” and one of the word “Creditiv”)11. 
When Kant takes for certain that the objective reality of freedom as super-
sensible causality is assured by the moral law, in the paragraph on the deduc-
tion of moral principle, he does not mentione the legality of the use of the 
concept of noumenale causality12. 
                                                                            
10  KpV, AA V: 48.1-6. 
11  About the legal meaning of the term “Creditiv”, cfr. Jens Timmermann, Das creditiv des mora-
lischen Gesetzes in “Studi Kantiani” 20/2007, 111-115. 
12  The paragraph about the deduction of the principle of moral ends with the affirmation that pure 
practical reason must be able to provide a certain type of knowledge: the concept of causality 
of noumena cannot be used so as to know theoretically, but if causality referring to actions of 
the will in the sensible world is not known in any way by the pure practical reason, it cannot 
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3. The deduction of the application of the category of causality to not 
empirical objects, i. e. the legitimacy of the concept of causa 
noumenon 
The paragraph “Von dem Befugnisse der reinen Vernunft, im praktischen 
Gebrauche zu einer Erweiterung, die ihr im spekulativen für sich nicht 
möglich ist” (which is the second and last paragraph of the first chapter of 
first book of the Analytic) follows the paragraph about the deduction of the 
principle of pure practical reason13. 
First of all, we need to understand what the extension of pure reason in its 
practical use really means14: 
An dem moralischen Princip haben wir ein Gesetz der Causalität 
aufgestellt15, welches den Bestimmungsgrund der letzteren über alle 
Bedingungen der Sinnenwelt wegsetzt, und den Willen, wie er als zu 
einer intelligibelen Welt gehörig bestimmbar sei, mithin das Subject 
dieses Willens (den Menschen) nicht blos als zu einer reinen Verstan-
deswelt gehörig, obgleich in dieser Beziehung als uns unbekannt (wie 
es nach der Kritik der reinen speculativen Vernunft geschehen konnte) 
gedacht, sondern ihn auch in Ansehung seiner Causalität vermittelst 
eines Gesetzes, welches zu gar keinem Naturgesetze der Sinnenwelt 
gezählt werden kann, bestimmt, also unser Erkenntniß über die Gren-
zen der letzteren erweitert, welche Anmaßung doch die Critic der rei-
nen Vernunft in aller Speculation für nichtig erklärte. Wie ist nun hier 
praktischer Gebrauch der reinen Vernunft mit dem theoretischen eben 
                                                                            
really produce any action. The practical knowledge of the concept of causality of noumena is, 
therefore, necessary to the production by the pure practical reason of actions in the sensible 
world. KpV, AA V: 49.34-50.13. 
13  KpV, AA V: 50.15. 
14  According to Giovanni B. Sala, the extension of pure reason in its practical use means the 
application of the category of causality to noumena; this application refers to the knowledge of 
the postulates of practical reason; G. B. SALA, „Kants Kritik der praktischen Vernunft”. Ein 
Kommentar (Darmstadt 2004), 130-136. For Sergio Landucci, the extension is represented by 
the knowledge of the moral law; S. LANDUCCI, La “Critica della ragion pratica” di Kant. 
Introduzione alla lettura (Roma 2001, III edizione, I edizione: 1993), 89-91. Filippo Gonnelli 
points out that for Kant the application of the category of causality to noumena represents the 
extension of reason. This extension consists in giving the category of causality objective 
practical reality; F. GONNELLI, Guida alla lettura della “Critica della ragion pratica” di Kant 
(Bari 1999), 105. 
15  KpV, AA V: 50.18-31. 
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derselben in Ansehung der Grenzbestimmung ihres Vermögens zu ve-
reinigen?16 
“An dem Prinzip moralischen haben wir ein Gesetz der Kausalität auf-
gestellt”, a law of causality, the determining principle (Bestimmungsgrund) of 
which is not given in the sensible world. The moral principle (Prinzip) 
determines the will in relation to its own causality through a law, which is not 
a natural one, “also” unser Erkenntniß17 über die Grenzen der letzteren 
[Sinnenwelt, F. B.] erweitert”. Thus, the extension consists doubtless, accor-
ding to Kants words, in having set a law as principle of morality, which is a 
law of causality of the determination of the human will, different from the 
natural law of causality. 
Furthermore, this extension of knowledge is a claim —Anmaßung— of 
reason, which in the speculative (theoretical) use of pure reason was declared 
(by the Kritik der reinen Vernunft) as not legitimate. Thus, a situation of 
doubt relating to a claim of legitimacy of knowledge takes place. 
The problem dealt in the paragraph is very clearly formulated. It speaks 
about the reconciliation of the practical use of pure reason with its theoretical 
use18. 
In other words: 
Aber wie wird es mit der Anwendung dieser Kategorie der Causalität 
(und so auch aller übrigen; denn ohne sie läßt sich kein Erkenntniß des 
Existirenden zu Stande bringen) auf Dinge, die nicht Gegenstände 
möglicher Erfahrung sind, sondern über dieser ihre Grenze hinaus 
liegen?19 
Kant refers to his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, where he deduced the objec-
tive reality of the concepts of intellect only in regard to objects of experience. 
He explains that through this deduction, he showed that the concept of cau-
sality implies the necessity of the connection cause-effect and that the possi-
bility of the category of cause arises from the pure intellect without the in-
terventetion of any empirical sources. Thus, the demonstration of the possi-
bility of thinking objects (Objekts), without determining them a priori, gives 
                                                                            
16  This is, in my opinion, the knowledge, which Kant refers in the last lines of the preceeding pa-
ragraph: “Die Causalität in Ansehung der Handlungen des Willens in der sie Sinnenwelt muß 
sie [reine praktische Vernunft, F. B.] auf bestimmte Weise erkennen, denn sonst könnte prak-
tische Vernunft wirklich keine That hervorbringen”. KpV, AA V: 49.34-37. 
17  KpV, AA V: 50,31. 
18  KpV, AA V: 54.3-6. 
19  KpV, AA V: 54.13-15. 
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them a place in pure intellect, from which they are applicable to objects in 
general (Objekte überhaupt), whether sensitive or not. What is missing in 
relation to the objects treated in the second Critique, compared to those of the 
first Critique, is the condition of the application of the categories, and mainly 
of that of causality20. In case of the theoretical knowledge of phenomena this 
condition is the intuition, which is not possible in the relation to noumena. 
Yet, continues Kant, it is no theoretical intention in order to know objects, but 
a practical intention that makes necessary the application of the category of 
causality to supersensible objects. 
Kant’s argumentation could schematized as follows21: 
The objective reality of a pure will is given in the moral law through an a 
priori fact of reason;  
· the concept of will contains the concept of causality;  
· the concept of a pure will is the concept of a causality with freedom 
(Kausalität durch Freiheit); this causality in the pure practical law a 
priori justifies completely (only with regard to the practical use of 
reason) the objective reality of the concept of a causality of freedom;  
· the concept of a being, which has a free will, is the concept of a causa 
noumenon;  
· the concept of causa noumenon does not contradict itself. This is 
assured by the deduction of the categories of intellect (where it is assu-
red that the concept of cause has objective reality also regarding to 
objects in general); 
· therefore, by the not theoretical use of reason it is possible to apply the 
concept of cause to things as pure intellectual beings; 
· as this application of the concept of cause cannot be related to any 
intuition, the concept of not empirical cause is empty, though possible 
and thinkable;  
· through the concept of causa noumenon we do not claim to know 
theoretically the constitution (Beschaffenheit) of a being, which has a 
pure will, but we simply indicate it;  
                                                                            
20  I refers mainly to the passage KpV, AA V: 55.11-56.11, where we find, in my opionion, the 
core of the argumentation. 
21  KpV, AA V: 48.17-50.13. 
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· through the concept of causa noumenon we simply connect the concept 
of causality with that of freedom and with the moral law as the 
fundamental principle (Bestimmungsgrund) of the latter;  
· the not empirical origin of the concept of causality gives us the right to 
do this, under the condition to use it only in relation to the moral law 
(which determines its concept of the reality of the facts). In other 
words, we have the right to apply the concept of cause to a being, 
which has pure will, exclusively by the practical use of pure reason. 
The issue of enlargement of the application field of the category of cau-
sality is already treated by Kant in the paragraph about the deduction of moral 
principle (which preceeds this one on the extension of pure reason in its 
practical use)22. Although the objective reality of causality of freedom was 
assured, Kant considers the possibility of the extension of this concept in 
order to the practical purpose without any reference to the legitimacy of this 
operation. 
Summing up, we find in this paragraph all the elements, that indicate the 
proceeding of a deduction. 
· Although we do not find in this paragraph the word “deduction” or the 
verb “to deduce”, the vocabulary used by Kant in this paragraph refers 
                                                                            
22  Cfr. R. J. BENTON, Kant’s second Critique and the problem of transchendental argument (The 
Hague 1977), 61-67. Benton points out that this section deals with the question about the 
deduction of freedom. For Benton means transcendental deduction the justification of a priori 
syntheses, which refer to the relation between distinct faculties; “[...] To justify a relation bet-
ween distinct faculties on a priori grounds means to show by the analysis of concepts that the 
functioning of one faculty is compatible with the funtioning of the other faculty” (62). In the 
case of the “Analytik der reinen praktischen Vernunft” the a priori synthetic relation between 
reason and will needs a justification (63). According to Benton, the conclusion of the 
paragraph about the deduction of the principles of moral is that there can be no deduction from 
a theoretical point of view, either of the moral law or of freedom; actually, this paragraph 
shows that we need a practical point of view in order to provide a deduction. “But even though 
the deduction cannot be carried through from a theoretical viewpoint [...], we do need to be 
able to show that the concept of free causality is at least not a theoretically impossible concept. 
This point does not really require an elaborate demonstration, since it is a conclusion drawn 
freom earlier arguments [...]. The section following the Deduction in the second Critique adds 
one further link in this argument: There Kant claims that the deduction in the first Critique not 
only justified the categories (and among them the cagetory of causality) for knowledge of 
objects of experience, but also justified their objective reality [...] for objects (Objekte) in 
general [...]” (64). According to Benton’s interpretation, the justification of the objective 
reality of freedom requires that the validity of the practical point of view is ensured. So, since 
the deduction fails theoretically, we need to change the framework within which the question is 
raised, i. e. to change faculty that determines knowledge (65). “The completion of the 
deduction, then, is accomlished by a switch to a practical point of view” (66). 
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(clearly already in the title) to the legal framework, in which a deduc-
tion takes place, as search of the origin of knowledge in order to be 
able to show its legitimacy. Actually, in this parargraph “Anmaßungen” 
and “anmaßen” are used twice; “Befugniss” and “befugt” four times, 
“Recht” and “Rechte” three times. 
· At the beginning of the paragraph Kant describes the situation of con-
flict between the differents claims of practical and theoretical reason 
concerning the field of application of the causality concept. 
· The proof of the authorization (Befugnis) to the enlargement of the 
application field of the category of causality is the specific theme of 
this paragraph. 
· Kant’s argumentation clarifies the origin of the concept of causality by 
showing it in the pure intellect. 
· The argumentation ends with the affirmation of the right to apply the 
category of causality to a non empirical object. 
Concluding, for the above mentioned reasons, I do think that Kant intends 
not only to show the objective reality of freedom, based on the law as fact of 
reason, but also to ensure the title of legitimate and indisputable knowledge to 
the concept of freedom as not empirical causality. In other words, he wants to 
show that pure practical reason extends legitimately the field of application of 
the category of causality beyond the one of the phenomena. The proceeding 
through which he does it is a process of deduction, which is completed in the 
paragraph on the extension of pure reason23. 
                                                                            
*  Part I of this paper explored the charge of an illicit inference in moving from fact to value, and 
was presented at a conference of the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture (University of 
Notre Dame) in Fall, 2006. 
